The Failure of the Spanish Crown’s Fiscal Monopoly over Tobacco in Catalonia During the 18th Century by Rafael Torres
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Universidad de Navarra
Working Paper nº 13/05
The Failure of the Spanish Crown’s Fiscal




Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Universidad de Navarra1
The Failure of the Spanish Crown’s Fiscal Monopoly over Tobacco





JEL No. O32, L14
ABSTRACT
The incorporation of Catalonia into the Spanish tobacco fiscal
monopoly offered an elevated consumer potential and theoretical
support for the expansion strategies of the monopoly, but when
put into practice the reality of the situation was quite
different. Although the Renta del Tabaco aspired to create a
perfect monopoly, and this led it to control all the facets of
the tobacco trade, from its production up to its sale, it
nonetheless failed to keep the market closed. The Catalan
interests in relation to tobacco previous to the incorporation of
Catalonia into the estanco  continued to exist, and served to
exploit the weak points of the monopoly. The Spanish monopoly had
to face a flexible, well-structured illegal market sustained by
the Catalan merchants, the international trade and, ironically,
supported by the French tobacco monopoly. The very expansion
policy of the monopoly, with its supplying of quality tobacco and
uniform prices, actually helped to worsen the situation. The
result of this struggle between two markets was that throughout
the XVIII century the monopoly lost its market of Catalan
smokers, and had to satisfy itself with the demand for snuffed
tobacco (which was limited to few cities), while having to face
an active contraband movement that flowed from Catalonia towards
the rest of the Spanish monopoly.
Rafael Torres Sánchez





THE FAILURE OF THE SPANISH CROWN’S FISCAL MONOPOLY OVER





According to Hilton Root, the creation of fiscal monopolies during the Old
Regime was the solution elaborated by the European kingdoms in response to their
inability to fund themselves when exposed to competitive and open markets
1. Although
the majority of economic thought was quite contrary to these monopolistic practices,
principally because they produced unfair prices
2, the states had to give in to these
systems when faced with the need to increase their fiscal revenues or otherwise assume
the costs of a widespread taxation. As Adam Smith concluded, the fiscal monopolies
established over the tobacco trade were much more justifiable as a means of providing a
certain amount of ease in the collection of taxes over the product’s consumption, than
they were as being the result of the impossibility of producing tobacco on European
soil
3. 
The fiscal monopoly system ceased to be convenient for the state when the
problems with its management were factored in.  The solutions proposed by the
European states in response to the complications derived from the organization and
operation of the monopolies were diverse. England, for instance, preferred to quickly
eliminate its monopoly over the tobacco trade (1627-1640
4) and instead confide in the
re-exportation of tobacco from the Americas to Europe as its chief manner of obtaining
financial gains. Meanwhile, France chose to abandon the cultivation of tobacco on
French soil in exchange for ceding the monopoly to certain contractors or “farmers-
general” (1674), due to the fact that they offered incomes greater to Exchequer and
financial support for key projects of the French Crown’s economic politics, such as the
Indies Company
5. The French Crown attempted to extend the monopoly and then take
complete control, but its continued financial difficulties prevented their repeated
attempts to evict those contractors from their positions. The Spanish Monarchy was
somewhat more successful than their French counterparts. The strategy followed in
hopes of solving the operational complications was expansive. The Spanish tobacco
monopoly gradually acquired territories and markets, in the metropolis as well as in the
colonies, whilst at the same time it developed administrative controls that were
increasingly more and more direct
6.  
                                                          
1 H.L. Root; The Fountain of Privilege. Political Foundations of Markets in Old Regime France and
England, (Berkeley, 1994), p.166.
2 R.de Roover; “Monopoly Theory Prior to Adam Smith: A Revision”, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 65, 4 (1951), p. 524.
3 A. Smith, La riqueza de las naciones, (Madrid, 1994), p.227.
4 A. Rive, Alfred,“A Brief History of Regulation and Taxation of Tobacco in England”, The William and
Mary Quarterly,  2nd Ser., Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1929), pp. 73-87, p.74.
5 Price Jacob M. France and the Chesapeake: A History of the French Tobacco Monopoly, 1674- 1791,
and of Its Relationship to the British and American Tobacco Trades, (Michigan, 1973).
6 A. González Enciso, Agustín y Rafael Torres Sánchez (eds),), Tabaco y Economía en el siglo XVIII,
(Pamplona, 1999).2
2
In this article we wish to study the expansion strategies used by the Spanish
tobacco monopoly, the Renta del Tabaco or tobacco estanco, from the point of view of
one of the regions incorporated in this system: Catalonia. Catalonia presented a great
potential for tobacco consumption throughout the XVIII century. Within the Kingdom
of Spain, it was one of the regions with the greatest economic and demographic growth,
with elevated levels of urbanization and a tremendously notable military presence
within its population. This military presence was a consequence of the Catalonia defeat
in the War of Spanish Succession and its choice to oppose the victor of that war, Phillip
V. If this potential were indeed fulfilled, Catalonia was in position to become one of the
regions with the greatest tobacco consumption under the Spanish Crown and, certainly,
a key bastion for the continued expansion of the Spanish tobacco monopoly. However,
repeated efforts by the tobacco monopoly to activate the potential consumption benefits
of the region failed to reap the expected gains. On the contrary, the Catalan smoker was
apparently able to access other sources for tobacco that were decidedly not part of the
monopoly, sources which managed to develop significant demand, while the monopoly
continued its policy of stocking up and marketing products that were nonetheless not
consumed by their supposedly captive market. The theorized potential for tobacco
consumption in Catalonia ended up rapidly turning into a series of serious problems for
the Spanish tobacco monopoly. This study can be of use in evaluating the strategies of a
fiscal monopoly that placed greater focus on the expansion of a captive market, rather
than in the possibility of a change in the market’s demand.  
2.- The tobacco market in Catalonia during the XVII century.
During the first third of the XVIII century Catalonia was incorporated to the
Spanish tobacco monopoly, as a result of the expansion of the Castilian tobacco tax
Renta del Tabaco and unification of the peninsular kingdoms under the rule of Phillip
V. Since 1636 the Castilian treasury had established the fiscal monopoly over the
consumption of tobaccos. In its evolution during the XVII century, and especially since
1683, the Castilian Renta del Tabaco gradually accumulated a number of institutions
and legislation in order to improve the control of the crown over the operation confided
to a contractor. The growing economic importance of the Renta del Tabaco for the
Spanish Exchequer encouraged Phillip V to establish (1701) a direct administration and
a monopoly over sales by way of estancos. This opened itself to the possibility that the
other kingdoms might soon establish similar estancos, although those would be run by
regional institutions
7. The strategy was simple enough: filling the peninsular territory
with a series of estancos would avoid illegal commerce and improve the viability of the
fiscal monopoly.
The reception of this expansion strategy was not very positive in Catalonia due
to the fact that this Kingdom already had a significantly developed tobacco trade of its
own, with interests clearly different from those of Castile. Like other peninsular
kingdoms, since the mid-XVII century steps had been taken in Catalonia to establish
fiscal monopolies at local and municipal levels; however, the difficulties in fully
implant these monopolies were overwhelming. One example of this was the strong
objections of the Catalan mercantile community to the attempts of the Consell de Cent
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(Council of the One Hundred), the city’s governing body, in 1653 to limit the sale of
tobaccos in the city of Barcelona
8. Much as the mercantile community of Seville had
done in response to the project to create the tobacco estanco in Castile in 1636
9, the
Catalan tradesmen who, according to Carrera Pujal, “managed the (tobacco) business
well and counted with abundant capital”, saw the estanco as a threat to their flowering
business of importing and selling tobaccos
10. 
Everything indicates that the Catalan merchants participated in the international
tobacco trade since the mid-XVII century. The tobacco contacts with France seem to
have already been very active. The majority of the tobacco with domestic leaves from
France,  Guienne, produced between 1647 and 1651 had as a main exportation
destination the Italian ports of Genoa and Leghorn, as well as ports in Catalonia
11;
according to the Dictionnaire universel de commerce of Savary, Barcelona was,
together with Havana and Portugal, one of the main distribution centers for tobacco
destined for France
12. It was quite common for Catalan merchants to travel to Lisbon in
search of Brazilian tobacco for later distribution (legal or illegal) in Mediterranean
markets
13. If we consider that the Catalan merchants already had significant contact
with the international tobacco trade, and to this we add the sudden emergence of the
tobacco monopoly in Castile, we can begin to understand why those same merchants
would be so opposed to the establishment of a similar tobacco estancos in Barcelona. 
The Catalan merchants’ opposition to the tobacco estanco was recorded by way
of a number of complaints and efforts made in the Royal Audience of Barcelona against
the monopoly, as well as by way of direct pleas before the Consell de Cent. In the end
these efforts were worthwhile, as the counselors accepted the substitution of the estanco
with an increase in the taxes levied upon the tobacco prices in Barcelona. In other
words, the institutions involved renounced any attempts to establish any sort of
monopoly over the acquisition and sale of tobacco, the costs were passed on to the
consumer, and the conditions of the tobacco business were kept unchanged as a whole;
in this way the possibility of importing and distributing tobacco, within and outside of
Catalonia, was maintained (in precisely the same manner as England)
14. 
The victory of the Catalan mercantile community, in clear contrast with their
Sevillian counterparts, must be understood as being a result of Catalonia’s position of
lesser financial dependence and greater monetary stability (in far better shape than the
Castilian treasury – at the time somewhat troubled). It is also important to note the little
effect that the tobacco taxes of the time initially had on Catalonia. In 1667, for example,
even after a 20% rise in the price of tobacco, the Catalan tobacco trade, together with
aguardiente (a type of liquor) accounted for only 2,9% of the taxes collected by the
treasury in the city of Barcelona
15. In other words, tobacco maintained a financial
importance that was scarce, at best, for the Catalan treasury, and this favored the
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interests of the Catalan merchants, who thought of markets and consumers not only in
Catalonia. 
As the tobacco tax gradually began becoming an increasingly important matter
in the Catalan municipal finances, the interests of the treasury and the interests of the
merchants also began to grow more and more incongruous, increasingly conflicting. Up
until the beginning of the 1690s, the tobacco tax served as complimentary income, often
used to compensate for descents in the fiscal pressure over wine, the true interest of the
Catalan taxation
16. The merchants accepted this increment in pressure while the
commercial conditions for the trade (the importation and distribution within and outside
of Catalonia) remained unchanged. In fact, the relations between Catalan merchants and
Lisbon grew during the final decades of the XVII century and, by the same hand, the
imports from France also increased, especially from 1676, when the cultivation of
domestic tobacco was prohibited except in Bordeaux and Montauban, regions near the
Pyrenees border, “most of which was usefully exported to Italy and Spain”
17. As Gilbert
Larguier concluded, the illegal commerce through Spain was especially intense in
Rousillon, where “la contrebande est donc antérieure à l’établissement du monopole
espagnol sur le tabac fondé en 1701 auquel on la fait généralement remonter”
18. It is
quite certain that the great Catalan merchant community found tobacco to have a
notable growth factor
19. Meanwhile, those who benefited from the tobacco tax took
advantage of the fiscal growth to improve the conditions of the beneficiaries, principally
by increasing the number of years in the stipulated in the contract
20.
3.- The opposition towards the Tobacco Estanco in Catalonia.
The more open and dynamic character of the Catalan tobacco market in contrast
to its Castilian counterpart became clear, precisely, in 1701 when the Catalan Corts,
Parliament, decided to follow the Castilian example and humor the new Bourbon
monarch by monopolizing the tobacco consumption in the Catalonia. The objections in
the  Corts of Barcelona in 1701 towards this possibility was significant, and the
arguments presented illustrate the transcendence of the issue. In this assembly it was
argued that the estanco would be an innovation difficult to apply in the Kingdom, as
Catalonia was “so expansive and open that paramount care and a voluminous
administration would be necessary, as this thing new and unprecedented”. Moreover,
the estanco did not seem to be a profitable novelty, as it was predicted to produce an
income of some 15 to 20,000 pounds a year, while at the time the city of Barcelona had
a budget of 200,000 pounds. It was argued that, besides having few benefits, the
measure would make it necessary to compensate the Catalan cities that had already
established it, as they would now be losing it to Barcelona. They even went so far as to
suggest that the tobacco estanco was, in itself, an inherently unjust system in that it was
in essence a case of urban demand penalizing rural consumers. However, there was one
particularly outstanding argument, and it was that of the fear that the establishment of
an  estanco  would cause a decline in Catalan foreign trade and the possibilities of
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introducing wares, such as tobacco, to the peninsular interior: “as much of the
merchandise that is today sent on to the kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia would cease
to enter the Principality”
21. 
The problem, therefore, was not so much the demand, nor even the treasury, but rather
the fact that the tobacco estanco would suppose a major control over trade and create a
plethora of obstacles for the commercial circuits, for which tobacco had become a key
strategic product. Indeed, when those same Corts finally decided to establish the
estanco for the entire Principality of Catalonia and the operation of such was auctioned,
there were a number of significant offers for the privilege. The first came from a group
of merchants from the city of Mataró, who offered 217,500 pounds for five years, a
figure far exceeding the most optimistic of estimates but nonetheless explicable because
of their “intention to divert towards their city the greater part of the tobacco traffic”
22.
This offer was quickly surpassed by one offered by a group of merchants from
Barcelona who, although for the smaller sum of 208,803 pounds, and for two months
less, formed an important cooperative headed by Josep Durán, amongst whom the
notables of Catalan commerce and merchants of tobacco could be found
23. The main
objective of this company was the acquisition of raw tobacco and processing and
repackaging of it in private mills before its distribution. The purchase of the tobacco
was outside the realm of control of the institutions, and, with that, a little envied part of
the tobacco business. Somehow the basic operations of the business had not changed all
that much.  The Catalan merchants were able to continue accessing and participating in
the international tobacco market, while satisfying the Catalan demand for tobacco, and
continuing to transport tobacco from Catalonia to other regions and estancos within the
Iberian Peninsula. 
In spite of that which was achieved, the Catalan mercantile community’s
pressure to eliminate any sort of institutional control over the tobacco trade continued to
exist, and they did not take long to resurface. In the Corts of Barcelona of 1706 the
controversy resurged when it came time to debate the advantages of not renewing the
estanco. Once again, it was alleged that the estanco  was “causing more harm than
good”, and it went so far as to propose suppressing the estanco and replacing it with an
authentic tax levied upon all inhabitants of the Catalonia, including those belonging to
the military and ecclesiastic ranks (urban and rural), as an alternative
24. In other words,
they were willing to propose a major fiscal pressure for all of Catalonia in exchange for
the elimination of the tobacco estancos. It is doubtless that were one to truly consider
the importance of the tobacco trade, not because of what it contributed to the Catalan
treasury but rather because of what it was willing to sacrifice, one could conclude that it
would be more than significant. Clearly the tobacco market in Catalonia was going in a
different direction than that of its Castilian counterpart. 
4.- The establishment of the Tobacco Renta in Catalonia
Whilst in Catalonia the means of limiting or doing away with its own tobacco
estanco were debated, the Spanish Crown was occupied with developing its own policy
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of a fiscal monopoly over tobacco based upon territorial expansion. For Phillip V, the
viability and efficiency of the tobacco monopoly was dependent upon the expansion of
the Renta del Tabaco to all of the peninsular territories. The legitimacy needed to enact
these plans was delivered with the Crown of Aragon and Catalonia’s insurrection
against, and subsequent defeat by, Phillip V during the War of Spanish Succession. 
The Pact of Genoa, signed in 1705 between England and Catalonia, by which the
Catalonia formally joined the cause of the Archduke Charles of Austria and promised to
support his claim to the throne, could have been the final step in transforming Catalonia
into a notable player in the international tobacco market, free and completely removed
from the Spanish monopoly. England’s allegiance with Catalonia required the securing
of several routes of communication with Barcelona. From Lisbon warships and English
merchants connected directly with Barcelona in order to transport gold and commercial
wares, amongst them Brazilian tobacco, for the sustaining of the allied armies; in this
same manner, the English used Genoa for sending economic aid and merchandise and
from 1707 they even reactivated direct commerce between London and Barcelona, in
which the exportation of English textiles and the re-exportation of colonial goods (such
as Virginian tobacco) was particularly outstanding
25. Catalonia, therefore, not only
avoided complete isolation and the dismemberment of its lucrative tobacco trade, but
actually managed to strengthen its position in the international tobacco trade. In other
words, Catalonia could have become a center for international redistribution for tobacco
from the English colonies, something that, with the strong growth of demand in the
French markets for north American tobaccos, without a doubt would have offered some
fascinating opportunities to the Catalan mercantile community. It was a community that
saw its alliance with Great Britain, even with the costs of dependence, as one with very
important possibilities for the future.
On the Bourbon front the plans for Catalonia were quite different. By way of the
chronicles of Fernando Ceballos, the director of the Renta del Tabaco in Catalonia, we
know that Phillip V’s intentions were clear from the very moment that his troops
crossed the Catalan border. He was named as head of the future Renta del Tabaco in
Catalonia in 1711, in the middle of the war and before Phillip’s troops had even reached
Barcelona, “to plan it...having begun back at Lérida”. In other words, the Renta del
Tabaco institution advanced in Catalan soil by the force of the Bourbon army. Along
the front, on the lands conquered before the capital surrendered, Ceballos gradually
established the organization of the entire administration, executive as well as judicial,
necessary for the efficient function of the Renta. He created the estancos and designated
who would run them in the cities and towns he found useful. He ordered the
construction of mills and cigar factories or took advantage of those already in existence.
Furthermore, just as he had done in Aragon, many of the cigar factories in Catalonia
were not destroyed expressively because of the need to fulfill the demands of the army
and because those tobaccos were, it was said, “of bad quality”, incomparable to those
one obtained by the Castilian monopoly and, in the judgment of this servant of the
crown, incapable of competing. The immediate need to satisfy the army led him to
organize, with attention to detail, the preparation of the leaves and the distribution of the
tobaccos within the Principality. Upon arriving to the gates of Barcelona in 1711,
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Intendant José Patiño named him, “in the field before Barcelona”, first General
Administrator of the Catalan Renta del Tabaco
26.
Phillip V’s over the Catalan authorities in 1716 gave him the legitimacy needed
for the Bourbon government to impose its serious reforms of the administrative
structures and the Catalan government, including its treasury, Royal Decree of Nueva
Planta, or reorganization. The Royal Treasury incorporated the majority of the taxes
previously collected by the Treasury of Catalonia, and imposed a new direct tax,
collected according to a census that attempted to be equal to the Castilian Rentas
Provinciales, and as such taxes were indirect, the remaining Castilian rights and
monopolies (tobacco, salt, sealed paper and general rents) were also introduced
27. The
Catalan institutions lost whatever margin of negotiation they had previously enjoyed,
with no control over the tobacco monopoly. The Catalonia found itself fully integrated
within the peninsular fiscal tobacco monopoly Renta del Tabaco. 
5.- The logic behind the monopoly as system.  
The war had allowed the geographic expansion of the Castilian estanco, but the
expansion strategies of the Spanish monopoly were still quite ambitious. By numerous
routes the effort to create a more perfect monopoly sought, and achieved, its objectives.
One notable example is the increased administrative control. In the years immediately
following the war, the Renta del Tabaco  had managed to establish a direct
administration to oversee the most important of their demarcations: Seville and Madrid.
In the rest of the provinces, the operation was entrusted to arrendandores particular
administrators, lessees, who were required to present their figures before the crown.
However, during the 1720s a new effort for the extensive restructure of the
administrative organization was undertaken, with the goal of ultimately eliminating all
subcontracting and establishing a complete, direct administration. This objective was
completed and activated in December of 1730. From that point onwards, and throughout
the rest of the century, all operations of the monopoly (sales and taxation) were
consigned to the hands of public servants. 
Meanwhile, and almost exactly at the same time, the Spanish monopoly
advanced towards achieving control over the supply of tobacco. Recognizing the French
government’s failure to suppress the subcontracting of the tobacco monopoly in France,
or its impotence to, once its continuity was admitted, at least make sure that the
tobaccos consumed were originating in French colonies, the Spanish Crown had more
success in imposing its mercantilist politics
28. In 1717 the Crown established an estanco
on the island of Cuba and the exclusive sale of tobacco was consigned to the Spanish
monopoly. Although some producers protested, and for some years it was necessary to
cede this exclusive privilege to the Royal Company of Havana, the Renta del Tabaco
managed to secure a privileged source for the supplying of raw tobacco. This system
was maintained until the end of century, on an imperial structure that allowed the silver
of New Spain to be used as an exchange for the purchase of raw materials in Cuba,
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which were later refined, exclusively, in the Royal Tobacco Factory of Seville
29. This
monopoly over the supply and production was complimented by the commercializing of
the product, something which was also under the control of the Renta del Tabaco, with
a fixed governmental control of the prices
30. From 1740 the tariffs that applied to the
public sale were made the same for the entire monopoly. From that point onwards, and
until 1809, the differences in price were not determined by the type of tobacco used, but
rather by the place and amount sold, “by the greater” or “by the lesser”. This allowed
the increase in the direct control over, and the more efficient collection of, the taxes of
the fiscal monopoly.   
This nearly perfect monopoly was extended to Catalonia without the slightest
problem. Catalonia, like the rest of the provinces, was incorporated to the Renta as a
provincial administration. In the capital of Barcelona one found the “main
administration”, where the main warehouses were also situated, from which the tobacco
was distributed to the rest of Catalonia, and where the most important of the Renta
officials resided. The factoría was also located in Barcelona, which served as the main
point of distribution for the other administrations, within the peninsular interior or along
the Spanish Mediterranean coastline. In 1714 Catalonia was divided into 17
administrations, which were themselves subdivided into colectas. The Renta del Tabaco
preferred to impose its own administrative structure over the one inherited from the
provincial forbearers, so the former territorial denomination of veguerías was replaced
by corregimientos in the Nueva Planta decree, and these, in turn, served as a base from
which the estanco administrations of Catalonia were determined
31. 
This administrative structure was very similar to those of other Spanish
provinces, and was maintained for the rest of the century. The most significant
innovation of the Renta del Tabaco in Catalonia was the notably greater dependence on
the military authorities of the region. The main political authority in Catalonia, the
Intendente, Intendant, besides being responsible over all military matters in said
province, was also responsible for the administration of the Royal Treasury in
Catalonia. The Accountant and Treasurer of the province, highest officials of the
Treasury after the Intendant were also members of the army. The result was that the
Intendente of Catalonia was, by proxy, also the most important official of the sub-
delegation of the Renta del Tabaco in Catalonia. As sub-delegates of the Renta del
Tabaco, the intendentes of Catalonia oversaw all matters related to tobacco, including
judicial issues, as well as the coordination with the Junta del tabaco, or Board of
Tobacco, and the Director Generals of the Renta del Tabaco in Madrid, especially in
matters dealing with the smuggling. The control and authority of the Intendant of
Catalonia over all related to tobacco in the Principality was maintained throughout the
XVIII century and came to be a key issue in the projects proposed by the Board of
Tobacco to modify or increase the number of administrations, in a clear attempt to
escape the direct control of the all-powerful Intendant. This was the case in 1727, when
the Junta successfully established sub-delegations in Mataró, Tarragona, Lérida, Vich
and Puigcerda, which, after a few years of confusing existence, were permanently
dismantled in 1731. The same occurred in 1740, when the creation of eight sub-
delegations in Mataró, Seo de Urgel, Tarragona, Tortosa, Gerona, Lérida, Puigcerdá and
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Talarn were proposed but ultimately rejected by the Intendant, who preferred to
maintain the sole sub-delegation of tobacco in Barcelona to oversee the entire
Principality
32.
  The direct control of the Intendant over the Renta del Tabaco in Catalonia
reduced the opposition of the Catalans to their incorporation in the monopoly and
improved the possibilities of fighting any discrepancy, while also offering the Crown a
privileged source of information with regards to the progress  of the monopoly in
Principality. 
Catalonia was also unique when compared to the rest of the provinces involved
in the Spanish tobacco monopoly in that a large percentage of its population was
military. The continued occupation of the province by large numbers of military
contingents was explained by the fears of a new uprising and by the strategic function of
Catalonia as a logistic center and exit point for the most important military expeditions
of the century, such as those that set off towards Italy (1717-1718, 1733-38 y 1743-48),
Portugal (1761), Algeria (1775) or Minorca (1782). This concentration of armed troops
was far superior to any other Spanish region. It is believed that between 20,000 y 30,000
soldiers were stationed in Catalonia during the first half of the XVIII century, although
during certain stages of the war the number of troops reached the 40,000 mark. During
the second half of the war these figures declined, but there were never any less than
20,000 soldiers in the Principality at any given point. If we take the number of bread
rations given out to the Spanish troops in the mid-XVIII century we can conclude that
approximately one in every four soldiers in Spain was stationed in Catalonia.
Throughout the second half of the XVIII century the position of Catalonia as the most
militarized region was ceded to Andalusia, but the Principality followed in the second
position. These figures are even more relevant if we take in mind that throughout the
XVIII century the population of Catalonia only accounted for the 6 to 8% of the Spanish
nation
33. 
Catalonia, therefore, was completely incorporated into an estanco  by the
beginning of the 1730s, an estanco that continued to grow in its effort to expand the
monopoly. Its incorporation was facilitated by the marked dependence of the tobacco
monopoly’s administrative structure on the main political and military authorities. All
factors were in favor of the greatest possible success of the tobacco monopoly. The
demand potential for the region, which now reached a period of population and
economic growth, counted with the additional advantage of an elevated concentration of
troops, traditionally major tobacco consumers. The tobacco demand in Catalonia could
serve to confirm the lucrative possibilities of the policy of expansionism followed by
the Spanish monopoly. 
6.- The loopholes in the monopoly.
                                                          
32 E. Escartín; La intendencia de Cataluña en el siglo XVIII, (Santandreu Editor, Barcelona, 1995), p. 127,
p.256.
33  R. Torres Sánchez, (2002), “El gran negocio de la época, la provisión de víveres al ejército por
Francico Mendinueta (1744-1763)”,  Francisco Mendinueta: Finanzas y mecenazgo en la España del
siglo XVIII, (Pamplona, 2002) p.115.10
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The Spanish Renta del Tabaco monopoly aspired to have its administrations in
control of all the tobacco trade, from the exclusive acquisition of the raw goods in Cuba
or Venezuela to its refinement in Seville and Cadiz, to its later distribution and sale at a
fixed price
34. In order to make this monopoly effective, the Board of Tobacco devised a
complex administrative structure and trusted in the positive response from consumers
who were presented with a superior quality of American tobacco from the Spanish
colonies and refined in Seville, the most important being snuff, polvo
35, which the
monopoly supplied in its extensive web of stores. But this quality had a price. As Price
concluded, because of the state of the tobacco trade in France during the first few
decades of the XVIII century, “we need not concern ourselves much with Spain. Its
tobacco –whether from Venezuela (Verinas) or from Cuba – was several times more
expensive than any other on the European market and was only used by the French for
mixing in luxury snuffs”
36. While the Spanish monopoly’s strategy is comprehensible
from a mercantilist point of view, it required the renunciation of actively competing in
the European markets and it placed the monopoly in a constant defensive posture, faced
with the oscillations of the demands of consumers and the possibility that they could be
supplied from abroad. 
In this context of administrative construction, and emphasis on the offer of
quality, there were some loopholes in the monopoly, which were significant in the case
of Catalonia. The first steps of the monopoly in Catalonia pointed in a direction contrary
to the interests of the Catalan merchant community. It was thus that the supplying of
tobacco was entrusted in 1716 to two Sevillians, José Benítez and Francisco Miguel de
Alcalá, who appear to have been linked to the group of Portuguese Jewish converts of
Baltasar de Castro, very active in its relation with the Spanish Exchequer and Renta del
Tabaco
37. However, in the following years the supplying of tobaccos to the Barcelona’s
factoria gradually passed into the hands of the Catalan merchant community, whose
activity with the international tobacco markets in previous years no doubt facilitated the
Catalan participation. The Catalan ships not only managed to carry the monopoly’s
tobacco from Seville to Barcelona, but they also transported the monopoly’s tobacco
between the main Spanish ports on the Mediterranean, from Barcelona to Majorca,
Alicante and Valencia, and, furthermore, Catalan merchants offered the monopoly the
possibility of obtaining tobacco originating from “free port of Genoa” for the factoría of
Barcelona
38. 
Brazil-leaf tobacco was abundant amongst the tobacco shipments transported by
Catalan merchants. This type of tobacco, originating in Brazil, was rather popular in all
of Europe due to its agreeable odor, sweet taste and the simplicity in its consumption
whether by way of pipes, cigars, or chewing. Its popularity was also due to the fact that
the main supplier of this sort of tobacco, Portugal, maintained a policy of free market in
Lisbon, as well as its stable exportation prices throughout the century, which is what
attracted a plethora of merchants from all of Europe and provided the opportunity to sell
                                                          
34 A. González Enciso, A  “Los usos financieros del tabaco; o bien, para qué servían los dineros obtenidos
con la Renta del Tabaco  ”, (Las Palmas, 2000) p.25.
35 The tabaco snuff refined in Sevilla polvo was different from european tobacco snuffed  J.M. Rodríguez
Gordillo, La difusión del tabaco en España, (Sevilla, 2002), p.239 
36 J. M., Price; France and the Chesapeake… Op.cit.,  I, p.182.
37 R. Escobedo Romero; El monopolio fiscal del tabaco en la España del siglo XVIII, (Pamplona, 2005),
pp.457-458.
38 AGS, DGR, I, lg. 2403.11
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a popular tobacco at a competitive price
39. The demand for Brazilian tobacco quickly
became a solid alternative to the snuffed tobacco sold by the Spanish monopoly. 
The fiscal monopoly faced a grave problem, difficult to solve as it went against
the very reasons for which the monopoly existed. On one side, it had to admit that the
Spanish consumers increasingly preferred to consume Brazilian tobacco and, therefore,
it had to secure a steady supply for the monopoly’s points of sale. This meant the
monopoly would have to compete against its own main tobacco, that of Cuba, and it
meant that it would decrease demands upon the cigar factory in Seville. On the other
hand, it was not in the monopoly’s interest to expand the consumption of Brazilian
tobacco because this would require tobacco purchases to take place outside of the
Spanish Empire, which meant losing Spanish capital, as well as running the eternal risk
of contraband. As the Spanish Ministry of Finance affirmed, “Brazilian tobacco is
harmful to Spain as it removes silver from our Kingdom and opens the door to perpetual
fraud by foreigners who seek to introduce other tobaccos into Spain”
 40. The monopoly
had to decide between growing by servicing the tastes of its consumers or giving
preference to economic policies and patronizing domestic production. 
The Catalan merchants understood this reality, and they exploited Catalonia’s
incorporation into the Spanish tobacco monopoly as a means to extend their own
commerce. The evolution was quick, and from the 1720s a variety of Catalan companies
regularly offered to transport and distribute Brazilian tobacco to ports throughout Spain,
on behalf of the Tobacco Renta, in order to satisfy the supply needs of the monopoly. In
the following decade the Catalan dominance over the supplying of Brazilian tobacco
was almost total, and it remained so until the 1740s. This rapid rise was due to various
factors. One of them was the number of Catalan merchant houses interested in the
exportation of spirits to Cadiz and the importation of English textiles, which they
acquired during the direct purchase of Brazilian tobacco in Lisbon, and later distributed
in Catalonia and throughout the entire Levantine Coast of Spain. They offered this
service in order to convince the Board of Tobacco to accept their services. Some of
these Catalan merchant houses, like that of Miguel Pujol or that of José Vidal y Batella
of Barcelona, obtained important contracts from Madrid for the supplying of Brazilian
tobacco to the main peninsular ports, including that of Cadiz, throughout the 1730s 
41. 
In other cases, the main factor was relationship between Catalonia and Genoa
42.
The Genoese merchants had an intense presence in the Lisboan tobacco market, known
as the Jardin (literally, the “Garden”), because they were the ones in charge of the
supplying of Brazilian tobacco to the Italian monopolies, especially those of Sardinia
and Naples
43. The influx of tobacco towards Genoa, plus the exportation of domestic
French tobacco, made this the main entrepôt of tobacco for the Mediterranean.
Bernardo Gloria, for example, spent the decade between 1720 and 1730 developing a
web of contacts that linked the markets of Lisbon and Genoa in order to better serve
                                                          
39 R. Torres Sánchez “Capitalismo internacional y política estatal. Los asentistas del tabaco en la segunda
mitad del siglo XVIII”, Tabaco y Economía en el siglo XVIII, dir. A. González Enciso & R. Torres,
(Pamplona,1999), p.417.
40 Miguel Múzquiz to Spanish Consul in Lisbon, 28-4-1767, AGS, SSH, lg.1997.
41 AGS, DGR, I, lg.2403.
42 AGS, DGR, II, lg.4692. Reports from the Spanish Consul in Genoa to Spanish Ministry of Finance.
43 AGS, DGR, II, lg. 4688.12
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their contracts to supply Brazilian tobacco to the Spanish monopoly
44. Other Catalan
merchants, like Pedro Merizano, maintained strong relations with Genoese merchant
houses, such as those of Bensi, Gnecco or Maffoni, in order to keep up their business of
supplying provisions to the Spanish troops stationed in Catalonia or in Italy, or
transferring rents from Spanish aristocrats in Italy to Spain. They used their web of
contacts to secure important contracts for the purchase of Brazilian tobacco in Genoa,
destined to be sold to the Spanish monopoly
45.
The Catalan merchant community’s interest in the tobacco trade was
multifaceted, as it was not only a manner in which to accumulate “services to the king”,
something particularly important to a collective that was just then recovering from a war
of rebellion against the crown, but also an efficient means of obtaining (with those
contracts) capital or permission to legally use and export Spanish silver, essential for the
effectiveness of their commerce. These tobacco contracts also offered a legal cover for
smuggling of all sorts; mainly textiles
46, and the illicit importation of great amounts of
Brazilian and other types of tobaccos, such as those from Virginia, along the Spanish
coasts, particularly the Levantine
47. As was proven in the case of England, these
contracts for legal trade were the main source of contraband in the domestic markets, as
the allowed fraudulent accords with the port authorities and the relanding trade
48. Thus,
the monopoly’s need to import Brazilian tobacco, which accounted for approximately a
third of the tobacco sold by the Tobacco Renta in Spain
49, in order to satisfy the
demands of the Spanish consumers presented the perfect opportunity for the Catalan
merchant community to avoid being excluded from the tobacco trade whilst providing a
privileged position over the veritable source of riches that was the growing markets of
contraband goods throughout all of Spain, and especially in Catalonia itself. 
7.- The legal consumption of tobacco in Catalonia.
The monopoly began its run in Catalonia in a struggle against the black market
which, as we shall see, was deeply rooted in the society and economic structure of
Catalonia. The monopoly turned out to be less than perfect and left a margin for
alternative suppliers. A first reflection of this struggle to attract the Catalan smoker is
evident in the evolution of the numbers of tobacco consumers, recorded by the Renta
del Tabaco of Catalonia. 
                                                          
44 R. Fernández, “La burguesía barcelonesa en el siglo XVIII: la familia Gloria”, La economía española a
finales del Antiguo Régimen, (Madrid,1983), pp.33-40.
45 J. C. Maixé Maixe Altes, Comercio y banca en la Cataluña del siglo XVIII. La Compañía Bensi &
Merizano de Barcelona (1724-1755), (La Coruña, 1994) p.57.
46 E. Martín Corrales; “El contrabando en el litoral catalán en la primera mitad del siglo XVIII (1720-
1759)”, in López Nadal, G. (dir.) VIII Jornades d’Estudis Històrics Locals: el comerç alternatiu.
Corsarime i contrabàn (ss. XV-XVIII), (Palma de Mallorca, 1990)
47 Contracts in DGR, II, leg 4688, 4689 y 4695.
48 R.C Nash; “The English and Scottish Tobacco Trades…” Op.cit., p.360.
49 This accounted for 40% if one adds the Virginia tobacco. R. Torres Sánchez “Capitalismo internacional
y política estatal... Op.cit., p.417.13
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Table nº1.- Tabacco sold by the Renta del Tabaco in  Catalonia. 1731-1799
CATALONIA SPAIN CATALONIA
Consumed Population Consumed Consumed Population Consumed WITH RESPECT TO
SPAIN
Decade Per capita Per capita Consumed Población
(a) (b) (c ) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
1731-39 119.550 595.624 0,201 2.827.307 8.272.289 0,342 4,23 7,20
1740-49 105.747 647.787 0,163 2.686.387 8.561.683 0,314 3,94 7,57
1750-59 125.800 693.966 0,181 2.926.691 8.937.775 0,327 4,30 7,76
1760-69 119.498 755.452 0,158 3.192.466 9.399.387 0,340 3,74 8,04
1770-79 146.526 808.966 0,181 3.666.619 9.848.384 0,372 4,00 8,21
1780-89 115.324 877.797 0,131 3.134.377 10.267.145 0,305 3,68 8,55
1790-99 97.604 928.193 0,105 2.844.883 10.752.559 0,265 3,43 8,63
Sources: (a) AGS, DGR, I, 2403 y II, 4626. Pounds consumed, annual average; (b) and (e) in A, Moreno “La evolución de la
población española, 1500-1860”, Historia Moderna de España, (Ariel, Madrid, 2004);  (c) = b/a ; (d) AGS, DGRII, 4636
Pounds consumed, annual average; (f)= c/d, (g)=a/d*100; (h)=b/e*100.
According to the accounts of the very Renta del Tabaco, the sale of tobacco by
this monopoly in Catalonia actually declined as the XVIII century progressed. Against
all expectations, the Principality’s importance in the Spanish monopoly decreased, its
role growing smaller with each new figure of consumption rates, which were less
significant with each passing year. In the beginning of the 1730s the tobacco sold by the
monopoly in the Catalan estancos accounted for somewhat more than 4 percent of all
tobacco sold within Spain, with a maximum of 5.04 percent in 1733, while at the time
Catalonia accounted for over 7 percent of the total Spanish population. This paradox
continued to increase throughout the XVIII century, and particularly after the 1770s.
Thenceforth, and until the end of the century, the monopoly in Catalonia had its worst
results in terms of sales. While the Catalan population increased its growth rate,
eventually accounting for 8 percent of the Spanish total, the legal consumption of
tobacco declined and the participation of Catalonia in the total sales of the monopoly
declined notably, with a minimum of 2.57 percent in 1797. 
With the help of these figures we can conclude that the monopoly lost its market
in Catalonia as the XVIII century progressed, and this declined actually increased to a
far quicker pace from 1770 onwards. This contrasts with the conditions of Catalonia’s
urban, demographic, and economic growth during the last third of the XVIII century,
precisely one of the most intense growth periods of the 1700’s, and the Principality
continued to count with a huge military presence, which encouraged the belief that there
would be a strong rise in tobacco consumption in Catalonia, a belief shared by the heads
of the monopoly, who expressed their bewilderment at the monopoly’s inability to
register in Catalonia the incomes “which correspond to its expansion as well the tastes
of the natives”
50. In sharp contradiction, what we find instead is that during the XVIII
century the Catalans consume less tobacco than all other Spaniards: 40% less in the
1730s and a full 60% less in the final years of the century. 
                                                          
50 José Patiño, Sevilla 27-12-1731, AGS, SSH, 1767.14
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Why did the monopoly lose its Catalan tobacco consumers? The most immediate
answer to this question points to the prices of tobacco sold in the official stores
belonging to the monopoly. The crown proclaimed several increases in the price of
tobacco throughout the XVIII century, with the goal of meeting urgent financial needs
and avoiding further reforms of the treasury
51. There are a plethora of texts addressing
the convenience of not raising the prices in order to avoid the negative effects that such
measures had on the consumer, though those effects are never actually specified – we
can form some conclusions by way of drawing a comparison between the evolution of
the price of tobacco sold in the monopoly stores (contrasted against the consumption
rates in Catalonia) and the legal consumption of tobacco in Catalonia. 
Graphic nº1.- Real  price and legal consumption of tobacco in Catalonia. 
Sources: AGS, DGR, II, 4636.
This relation seems evident until about 1760. During this time the real price of
tobacco double between 1737 and 1746, and the sale of tobacco were reduced by 30%.
Later, on when the real price of tobacco declined between 1746 and 1754, the monopoly
sales in Catalonia some notable activity, rising over 40%. The increase in sale continued
with strength until 1760, even though the price of tobacco began to rise. In other words,
the 1750s were the golden age of the tobacco monopoly in Catalonia. From that point
onwards the relation between price and sales ceased to be balanced. The strong fall in
the true price of tobacco between 1760 and 1770 did not manage to revive the former
expansive stage in sales, and was even accompanied by that century’s fastest decline in
sales. During the last third of the century these inconsistencies continued, and a long
stability in the price of tobacco was not enough to revive the sales; they continued to
decline until ending the century with prices similar to those in 1737 but with 40% less
in sales. According to these figures one can conclude that the price of tobacco,
combined with the living conditions of the Catalans, may have in some way influenced
                                                          
51 A. González Enciso, “Los usos financieros del tabaco; o bien, para qué servían los dineros obtenidos
con la Renta del Tabaco  ”, Santiago Luxan, Sergio Solbes, JJ.Laforet (editores) El mercado del tabaco en




























































































the intensity in which monopoly tobaccos were consumed in the period prior to 1760.
After this date its influence seems to have declined in a significant manner, implying
that decline in sales was motivated by other factors.  
Upon having analyzed the domestic tobacco market in Great Britain of the
XVIII century, Robert C. Nash came to the conclusion that the British government’s
continued maintaining of high taxes on tobacco consumed in the interior did not (in any
decisive way) affect the levels of consumption, as the consumer found other alternative
suppliers to his demand, be it from changing the type of tobacco consumed to
purchasing contraband tobacco goods
52. In the case of the Catalan consumer, this search
for alternatives was provoked by the particular policies of supply practiced by the Renta
del Tabaco monopoly. 
While the French government, faced with contractors or “farmers-general” the
French tobacco monopoly who were interested in purchasing the cheaper tobaccos
originating from the British colonies, was incapable of imposing the tobacco originating
in its own colonies, the Spanish government had far more success with its mercantilist
policy of putting its colonial tobaccos first. This success allowed the Spanish monopoly
to offer a product of quality in its estancos, such as the Sevillian snuffed, but it also
obliged the monopoly to compete against other tobaccos. The competition was
especially intense with smoking tobaccos, made with tobacco leaves that originated in
colonies that were not under the Spanish dominion, like Virginia or Brazil, and that
were more appetizing, cheaper, more abundant and easier to consume
53.
Table nº2.- Types of tobaccos sold by the monopoly 
CATALONIA SPAIN
Snuffed Smoked Snuffed Smoked
% Index % Index % Index % Index
1731-34 40,7 69 59,3 180
1735-39 46,3 86 53,7 177
1740-44 64,1 100 35,9 100 67,3 100 32,7 100
1745-49 75,1 118 24,9 70 65,9 93 34,1 99
1750-55 74,5 132 25,5 16 61,9 95 38,1 120
1755-59 75,6 148 24,4 17 60,0 98 40,0 134
1760-64 80,3 161 19,7 14 58,8 101 41,2 145
1765-69 81,8 127 18,2 10 57,3 100 42,7 152
1770-74 75,8 160 24,2 18 52,4 101 47,6 189
1775-79 71,5 161 28,5 23 50,2 101 49,8 207
1780-84 70,4 114 29,6 17 48,9 82 51,1 175
1785-89 72,3 130 27,7 18 47,2 81 52,8 186
1790-94 83,0 134 17,0 10 49,3 76 50,7 161
1795-98 83,3 107 16,7 8 41,9 50 58,1 143
Sources: see table nº1.
                                                          
52 The British government was able to maintain this situation because at the same time it allowed the
reexportation of tobacco, which offered greater incomes by way of customs. R.C Nash; “The English and
Scottish Tobacco Trades …” Op.cit, p.369. 
53 R. Torres Sánchez, “El Banco de San Carlos y el negocio del tabaco. Una investigación de mercado en
el siglo XVIII”, (2000), Santiago Luxan, Sergio Solbes, JJ.Laforet (editores) El mercado del tabaco en
España durante el siglo XVIII: fiscalidad y consumo, (Las Palmas, 2000) p.118.16
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The sales of tobacco by the monopoly have been studied as a reflection of the
habits and inclinations of the consumers
54. According to them, throughout the XVIII
century the Spanish consumers gradually abandoned the regular use of tobacco snuff,
favoring the smoked tobacco instead, in other words, exactly the opposite of what
happened in France occurred. This quick change in the preferences of the consumers has
been interpreted as their reaction to the prices, which encouraged them to consume
cheaper tobaccos. In reality, the three price increases decreed by the government (1741,
1779, 1794) are not distinguished by the types of tobacco. The concurrence of prices
can only be understood as a desire to increase the levy and that the confidence in the
superiority of the Spanish colonial tobaccos sold by the Renta became a factor in the
preferences of the consumer.  The government was convinced that having the estancos
well supplied with quality tobacco was what “most influences the increase in the values
of the Renta”
55. Even when preference shift to smoked cigars became evident, the
government decided to encourage the consumption of Cuban cigars, ignoring the
monopoly director’s opinions, who considered it more profitable to secure the supply of
Brazilian tobacco because it was far more in demand by the consumer
56. 
A mercantilist policy in the supply of tobaccos, along with a conformance of
prices and a bet on quality,  supposed a strong dose of interventionism in market such as
the Catalan one, which had other options. The evolution of the sale of tobaccos in
Catalonia has shown us the possible outcome to that alternative. The smoked tobacco
sold in Catalan estancos nearly disappeared as the XVIII progressed. In the context of a
strong recession in tobacco consumption in Catalonia, and the general decline in the
consumption of snuffed tobacco in Spain, it is strange that the remaining Catalan
consumers would be particularly interested in buying snuffed tobacco. In the same way,
it is interesting to note that the increase in the per capita consumption in tobacco is
found as one examines its southern administrations and one comes away from the
French border. After Barcelona, the two administrations that sold the most smoked
tobacco were Tortosa and Tarragona, notably the two administrations furthest away
from the French border. This phenomenon of finding higher consumption rates as the
distance between the administration and the French border is increased continues down
to Valencia, where smoking tobacco was the type most sold.
According to the figures corresponding to the sales of the tobacco monopoly in
Catalonia, the bulk of the market was concentrated in four administrations: Barcelona,
Girona, Tarragona and Tortosa. These administrations had the largest populations and a
decidedly urban profile: they represented 54,1% of the population and consumed 70,3%
of all tobacco sold by the Renta in Catalonia. The greatest sales happened in the
estancos  of Barcelona, where, with only 14,2% of the total Catalan population, the
impact on the sale of tobacco was tremendous: 43,1%. This elevated concentration of
activity of the monopoly in the main urban centers, and in an extraordinary way in the
Catalan capital, can be explained by the very effects of urbanization on the consumption
of tobacco, but also by the theory that the monopoly was not so deeply entrenched in the
                                                          
54 L. Alonso, “Transformaciones en las pautas de consumo y crecimiento de la demanda en los orígenes
de la industrialización: el tabaco en España, 1735-1886”, Ler História, (27-28,1995), p.24. GRETA, “El
consumo de tabaco en España en el siglo XVIII”, Cuadernos de Investigación Histórica, (19, 2002),
p.324.
55 AGS, SSH, Muzquiz, 16-3-1737.
56  F. Gallardo, Origen, progresos y estado de las rentas de la corona de España, su gobierno y
administración, VII (Madrid, 1808), p.366-367.17
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interior of the Principality (the aforementioned cities are on the coast). If this is correct,
the monopoly may have even lost geographic territory to the Catalan tobacco market.
Table nº 3.- Geography of the sale of tobaccos by the Tobacco Renta in Catalonia. 1779
Tobacco Population Per capita Smoked / Smoked /
% % Total Snuffed
Barcelona. 43,19 14,20 0,52 43,5 27,0
Girona 9,60 19,22 0,09 4,4 12,2
Tarragona 9,56 15,16 0,11 12,5 35,0
Tortosa 7,96 5,53 0,25 14,1 47,2
Lleida 6,76 6,80 0,17 7,8 30,8
Cervera 4,55 5,05 0,15 2,8 16,6
Puigcerda 4,49 6,08 0,13 1,1 6,3
Vich 3,90 8,08 0,08 2,0 13,5
Mataro 3,72 6,76 0,09 3,9 28,0
Manresa 3,22 5,39 0,10 1,4 11,4
Villafranca 3,06 6,04 0,09 6,7 58,2
Total 100 100 0,17 100 26,8
Sources: AGS, DGR, I, lg. 2405.
We believe that all of these figures not only reflect a change in  the consumption
habits of Catalonia, but also indicate the existence of a market that clearly divided: on
one side one finds the legal tobaccos, supplied by the monopoly (mainly snuffed
tobacco, controlled strictly by the Renta del Tabaco in its factorías as well in its
distribution to the estancos of the Renta
57), and on the other side one finds the smoked
tobacco market, partially supplied by the monopoly (where not so much refinement is
required as the raw good can be smoked directly by the consumer) and, as we shall see,
an important alternative supplier with abundant goods and a sturdy structure. For this
reason, the unusual growth of snuffed tobacco consumption in Catalonia could be
considered a reflection of the monopoly’s inability to make their estancos attract the
consumers of the ascending smoked tobacco market. The progressive loss of the sales
capacity for tobacco in Catalonia indicates that the monopoly was able to attract only
those seeking quality, a market which each year was more and more geographically
isolated. The expansion potential that existed due to the potential for consumers in
Catalonia was not exploited as it should have been by the Spanish tobacco monopoly.
The monopoly’s supply politics and the Royal Treasury’s financial difficulties limited
the monopoly’s ability to easily offer a wide variety of tobaccos. The rise and
uniformity of the prices, as well as the emphasis on quality, did not help in attracting the
Catalan consumers, and it did nothing to respond to the growing black market, which
was by this point a flexible yet elaborately structured business. Let us now turn our
attention to how the illegal supplying of tobaccos to Catalonia served as a very real
alternative to the Catalan tobacco consumers. 
                                                          
57 The alternative to snuffed tobacco was French snuff, but the Renta attempted to compete with it by
producing it in Seville from 1786 onwards.18
18
8.- The illegal supply of tobaccos in Catalonia.
Before the monopoly was able to regulate the tobacco market in the Principality,
the Catalans had already secured the supplying of tobacco and they played an active part
in the tobacco trade, traveling directly to the most important European ports of
redistribution. The difference between the tobaccos sold in the estancos  and the
stability, and even decline, of the international tobacco prices, especially those coming
from Virginia and Brazil
58, encouraged the Catalans to participate in the illegal tobacco
trade. The monopoly’s efforts to stop the introduction of contraband tobacco was a long
and constant battle throughout the century, but the expectations and possibilities
changed and they indicated determined phases. 








Decade Anual Average Total Per capita Hypothesis Hypothesis %
1731-39 119.550 595.624 0,20 119.550 0 0,0
1740-49 105.747 647.787 0,16 130.020 24.273 18,7
1750-59 125.800 693.966 0,18 139.289 13.488 9,7
1760-69 119.498 755.452 0,16 151.630 32.131 21,2
1770-79 146.526 808.966 0,18 162.371 15.844 9,8
1780-89 115.324 877.797 0,13 176.186 60.862 34,5
1790-99 97.604 928.193 0,11 186.301 88.697 47,6
Sources: See Table nº1.
Appraising contraband is always a very difficult task, with the uncertain
results
59, although we can attempt to deduce a simple estimate based upon the
consumption rates that were expected. In order to do this we assume that the per capita
consumption was at least constant, when all the qualitative references point to a sharp
increase in consumption, and consider the difference as an approximate indicator of the
illegal commerce
60. According to this estimate, the consumption of illegal tobacco had
an elevated impact upon the Catalan tobacco market, particularly during the last third of
the XVIII century. The presence of contraband tobacco escalated, but not in any
uniform manner, as there were recessions in the 1750s and 1770s. The elevated success
of the black market was achieved at the end of the XVIII century, when nearly half the
tobacco consumed in Catalonia was purchased from sources that were not part of the
monopoly. 
Conclusions about the ascending success of this alternative market can be
discerned in the abundant information relating to the struggles of the monopoly against
such contraband. This information is principally qualitative, and biased in the interest of
the protagonists and the objectives of the monopoly, but it is nonetheless useful in
understanding the structure and operation of this alternative market.  
                                                          
58 R. Torres Sánchez “Capitalismo internacional y política estatal…”, Op.cit., p.437.
59 W.A.Cole: “Trends in Eighteenth-Century Smuggling”, The Economic History Review, 10, 3 (1958),
p.395.
60 R. C. Nash, “The English and Scottish Tobacco Trades …” Op.cit., p.364.19
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Near the end of 1731, the Secretary of Treasury, José Patiño, wrote to the heads
of the monopoly demanding to know why the value of the Renta del Tabaco of
Catalonia were descending, apparently unaffected by the efforts of the monopoly. The
Renta officials were also surprised that “although elevated steps had been taken by land
and by sea…there were no results in improving the values of the Renta del Tabaco”
61.
The crown was worried by this limitation of the tobacco monopoly in Catalonia because
its revenues were necessary for the wages of the troops stationed in Catalonia, who head
out from there towards Italy – for this reason Madrid had a special interest in the income
of the tobacco monopoly in that region. 









































































































Tobacco sold by monopoly in Catalonia
Revenue from tobacco in Catalonia
Sales in Catalonia regarding Spain
Source: AGS, DGR, I, 2405.
In the following years various reports were sent to Seville and Madrid
62 pointing
out the difficulties that the monopoly was having in extending consumption of tobacco
amongst the Catalans, something that seemed absurd considering the number of troops
present in the region, the enormous population and the “well-known consumption of
tobacco.” These reports coincided in informing Seville and Madrid that the main reason
why their task was so difficult was because the Catalans could easily find alternative
suppliers, which were obviously illegal. The reasons why that contraband existed, from
the point of view of the monopoly, were varied, but they all felt that the Catalan
authorities were serving as accomplices to the contrabandists: “the fraud continues in
Catalonia, those principally responsible being the very Catalan authorities who, because
of greed or dislike of the Spanish, decide to help them”. Concretely, they permitted the
cultivation of tobacco in Catalonia, which seemed to be somewhat extensive even
though the government expressively prohibited this: “the sowing of tobacco is so
extensive that it threatens to ruin the Renta”
63; and they also covered for the
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contrabandists, amongst whom one could openly note Catalan agents and merchants:
“the mayor live with the contrabandists and the ecclesiastics clothe and protect them”
64.
On a more secondary level, but nonetheless importantly, the monopoly officials also
alluded to the difference in prices as being the reason for the contraband problem: “the
elevated cost of tobacco, all priced the same, contributes in no small way to the
declining consumption”
65. 
During the first phase, which can be placed in the decade that lasted from 1730
to 1740, the illegal market grew in a most notable manner and the main reasons point to
the complicity of the Catalan society. In the following periods, with the greater presence
of the monopoly in Catalonia, there was a significant evolution in the arguments used
by the Renta officials to explain the illegal market. They began to insist that it was
caused by foreign forces, pointing to the increasing active contraband of international
tobacco to Catalonia, and the focus was thus shifted to the borders, land as well as
maritime.  
From the end of the 1740s until the end of the 1750s the news of contraband in
Catalonia declined significantly. The near disappearance of reports between Barcelona
and Madrid during those years regarding the issue of the tobacco problem coincide
notably with  a rise of legal tobacco sales, surpassing even the national average. This
was the authentic “golden age” of the monopoly in Catalonia, and it ended soon, giving
way to a profound transformation of the tobacco trade. In the decade following, the
1760s, the Catalan estancos  lost 40% of their previous sales, particularly with the
smoked tobaccos, and the reports concerning the rise of contraband movements
resurfaced. This new resurgence, which does not coincide with an alteration of the
monopoly prices, may be related to the changes in the French monopoly. The financial
headaches of the French crown led it to allow the sale of bureaucratic posts in the
tobacco monopoly, something prohibited since 1694. As Price pointed out, “anyone
who bought such an office intended to make more than normal profits out of it by
fraud”. Furthermore, in 1751 a refinery was established in the French port of Cette, for
tobacco imported from Chesapeake;  “Cette became a fixture in the international
tobacco trade, receiving ten or more British tobacco ships a year with two million and
more pounds”
 66. From that point onwards, the problem with tobacco being brought in
from France became a chronic one. 
The heavy presence of troops in Catalonia may have served as a catalyzing
element in the secular contraband. As Larguier noted, the elevated demand from the
troops stationed in Catalonia activated the commercial movements from Languedoc
towards Catalonia. The exportation of provisions and, above all, livestock, turned into
an intense commercial flow, and it even increased throughout the century with the
growing demands for provisioning from the people of Barcelona, providing an exclusive
route for the shipping of contraband
67.
The increase of contraband prompted the military authorities in Barcelona, as
well as the monopoly officials, to begin sending continuous reports to Madrid in which
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they alerted the capital to the existance of numerous tobacco warehouses along the
French coast. The most important ones were in Bañuls, which was called the “tobacco
fair”, where Catalan ships took tobacco from Genoa, frequently under the names of
French merchants. Here the merchants of Roussillon’s support of the contraband is
clearly evident, so much so that it actually became the average source of income for that
region, which was known by the French authorities as the “contraband republic”
68.
From various points throughout Rousillon, and particularly from the deposits of
Bañuls, the tobacco was sold to the Catalan contrabandists who would then bring them
into Catalonia on foot. The Spanish authorities suspected that the ones behind those
warehouses were the French agents and merchants. As the Intendant of Catalonia, Baron
de la Linde, informed the Secretary of Treasury, Miguél Múzquiz, the interest of those
farmers-general of French monopoly in the warehouses and the contraband was as a
means of augmenting the rates of the French monopoly, and the strategy that they used
was to keep all the points of sale along the French border well supplied in order to
attract the Catalan contrabandists: “this illicit comerse, in which the farmers-general are
so interested, managing greater consumption, extractions from the operations, and from
the tobacco storehouses of Bañuls… there is nothing more clever than the French tactic
of stocking  the adundant muslins and other such forbidden goods, as well as their finest
tobaccos, in their towns nearest to our border, to serve as bait and as a continuous
temptation for those who would think of introducing them”
69. Several efforts to close
these warehouses diplomatically were undertaken, and several accords between France
and Spain regarding the tobacco contraband were signed, as occurred in 1765 and
1774
70, but the results were practically nonexistent. This was due in part, as one Spanish
official commented, to the complicity of the very French government, which allowed
these dealings to occur: “as many year’s experience has shown me, they (the French
government and the Commander General of the Rosellón) have attempted to impede the
introduction of the goods in many ways, and they have never managed to do so, as these
goods have instead been found in greater quantities, and therefore one should be alert
and think only of defending one’s home”
71. 
If it was impossible to stop the influx of illegal tobacco by way of the French
border, it was even more difficult to stop the shipments coming from Genoa, which in
large part ended up in the French warehouses
72. Genoa’s position as the main tobacco
redistribution center in the Mediterranean was based upon its ability to supply several
Italian tobacco monopolies, most importantly that of Naples, and its solid sale of not
only tobacco, but also English textiles, brought from the markets of Lisbon and
Amsterdam, mainly by way of Jewish merchant houses. The Catalans had always
maintained a fluid trade relation  with port ligur, and the tobacco was an opportunity on
which they could not afford to pass. The citing of Genoa as the origin of the contraband
tobacco in Catalonia is constant throughout the XVIII century, but these references are
particularly intense after 1760. According the Spanish consuls in the ports of the Gulf of
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Lyon, the tobacco contraband from Genoa was much more active during the last third of
the XVIII century
73. 
From these reports one can deduce that there was a certain evolution in the
methods used. Until the 1760s contraband from great English, French or Genoese ships
that passed along the French coast, on their way to Genoa or Cette, sent small boats to
unload shipments in the French and, to a lesser degree, Catalan coasts. Later on, the
method most frequently used was for Catalan ships to sail directly to Genoa to pick up
the shipments, and then introducing them by way in the Principality by way of the
French or Catalan coastline. In this second phase, the role of the Catalan ships was
distinguishable, “only Catalan ships and Genoese ports practice this illicit commerce, as
no French take part, and few British”
74. These Catalan ships worked alone, or in
coordination with the merchants of Bañuls, Colliovre or Port Vendre, who would later
purchase the majority of the tobacco. The reasons under which the Catalan ships
obtained licenses from the Spanish authorities to travel to the Italian coast were varied.
The most common were claims of transporting wine, and indeed the greatest activity
was reported “after the fermentation of the grapes, when they traveled to Genoa to
obtain the wines and return with hidden tobacco”. In the same manner, the Catalan
fishing ships, called corredoras (runners), would go along the coast, towards Sicily,
collecting coral
75. The coral served for obtaining tobacco in the ports as it was an
excellent means of payment. In Genoa there was a great demand for coral, mainly from
English merchants who, in their own right, used it for their trade with India
76. Another
means of payment used by these fishing boats was to invest their fishing salaries,
mainly in pounds, for the acquisition of certain contraband and, thus, avoiding the 5 or
6% loss in the exchange rate”
77.
The tobacco competition was not only limited to price, as quality was also a
factor, which was foreseeable for, as we recall, this was the particular strength of the
Spanish monopoly. The tobaccos sent from Genoa were of a quality that surprised the
Spanish authorities when they would discover a shipment: “that from Brazil and from
Genoa were of the same quality than those sold in the name of His Highness, yet only
great difficulty could one know…great quantities of Brazilian and Genoese tobacco,
matching those of Spain”
78.  Moreover, a constant complaint of the Spanish authorities
was that when compared with the tobacco contraband, the tobaccos sold in the Catalan
estancos were of “a perverse quality”
79.
In the last third of the XVIII century the issue of the tobacco contraband became
complicated when it began to be a problem of public order
80. Those responsible for the
safekeeping of the monopoly began to be overwhelmed by the presence of gangs of
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smugglers that were very large in number; “it is true that the tobacco contrabandists
have truly embedded themselves in Catalonia”
81 Some seemed to be authentic armies,
which passed before customs posts with total impunity
82. What initially had probably
been collaboration between the people and the local authorities had turned into a serious
issue of social and public order. It is very significant that part of the Catalan society
offered to actively collaborate to eliminate what Francisco de Novell, Deputy of the
Kingdom by way of the Nobility of Catalonia and Majorca, called the “faeces of the
Principality”. The Catalan nobility saw the opportunity to commend itself to the Crown
in a matter not only of notable importance to the Royal Treasury, but also an issue of
public safety, for which it offered to solve the smuggling problems “privately”.  Gabriel
Garriga, in name of the Guilds and the Barcelona Trade Corps, also offered to
“exterminate those enemies of the nation”
83.
Faced with this accumulation of issues, Madrid’s response could not have been
more significant: “let the administrations and estancos be well stocked with tobaccos of
quality and popular amongst the consumers, as this will contribute to the improvement
of the Renta income”, whilst ordering an authentic militarization of the border
84. In
1761, at the orders of the Marques of la Mina, Captain General of Catalonia, three
infantry companies were mobilized to the border. In 1770 the Guadalajara regiment was
sent. In 1772, the Count of Ricla proposed creating a permanent force of 4 battalions,
but their elevated cost of maintaining dissuaded him from following through with these
proposals. In 1778 the infantry squadrons of Valls, with some 400 men, were organized
and sent off, to help with the safekeeping of the Tobacco Renta’s interests. There was
even special care in ordering those implicated (military, judicial, municipal, reserve) to
cooperate and be coordinated in the fight against contraband
85. 
The militarization of the border gave significant results, as from 1770 to 1779
the monopoly’s sales in Catalan estancos increased rapidly, by nearly 50%, reaching a
century high sales point. Notably, the Brazilian tobacco, which till then had been
dropping progressively, suddenly reversed its downward tendency and grew until
reaching the point at which it accounted for 26.4 percent of all the tobaccos sold in
Catalan estancos. 
Such a militarization of the border was impossible to maintain for a long period
of time. For one thing, there was the issue of the cost of such a mobilization. Since 1772
the Renta del Tabaco of Catalonia recorded the amounts spent on this measure. That
same year 8,36% of all the monopoly’s income was used to pay the military fees, and
the cost increased. In 1780 it reached 13,34% of the income, and by the end of the
century it accounted for 16,02%, and this was probably just the tip of the iceberg of an
expense that was spiraling out of control
86.  Meanwhile, there was the other issue of the
cost of the American War of Independence
87. In contrast to other conflicts, in which war
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produced a freeze-up of trade and military control of traffic and, therefore, the
possibility of a rise in interior consumption, in this war the tobacco consumption once
again dropped. Once again, the reason involved the French border. The Spanish
government retired its troops from the border with its ally in order to station them in its
many open fronts during that war, and particularly for the invasion of Minorca. With the
sudden easing of security at the border, the situation quickly returned its 1760s
conditions, and once again the monopoly lost consumers and, in fact, the war years
caused a veritable sinking of tobacco sales in the Catalan estancos.
After the war, the struggle against contraband was even more complicated. The
rise in the price of tobacco in Spain had only served to augment the difference in prices
of those tobaccos coming from France and, above all, those from Genoa, providing the
stimulus for a perseverance of the illicit trade. As if this were not enough, the tobacco
contraband actually grew stronger with the ascent of silver smuggling. The same
smugglers that brought duros, silver coin, on their trips over brought tobacco on their
return voyages. The Spanish authorities reported to Madrid in 1783 that Catalan
smugglers were going with silver to buy tobacco in Bañuls. In these exchanges, the
Catalans were not alone. Frequently they are reported to be associated with French
merchants, who the authorities call “foremen of smugglers” because “they help them,
giving them provisions and other aid”
88. In some cases, as the Spanish Consul to
Coliouvre reported, these associations came to the point in which “the greatest
smugglers that were ever known in these parts, be they involved in the tobacco and
silver contraband from Catalonia to France” were partners with the director of the
banking house of Perpignan that, in its own right, was connected to the banking houses
of Paris
89. 
The contraband activities of the French Farmers-general on the Catalonian
border also intensified and contributed to the continuance of the tobacco smuggling.
They were under pressure from the French Crown during the 1780s, as it had reduced its
permits to the French royal tobacco and salt monopolies, and had raised its tobacco
supply fees
90. Thus was the temptation to continue smuggling with Catalonia even
greater. In 1785 the Spanish authorities discovered that not only the French contractors
had the number of tobacco warehouses along the border multiplied, but such
warehouses were also being established all across the Rosellón, and even in Sardinia,
where there were important Brazilian tobacco deposits that were obligated to sell “to
none other than the Spanish, giving comfort to the buyers who wished to travel safely
throughout the Rosellón”
91. The prices in these deposits were, on average, about 10
reales (rs) per pound, and the Spanish estancos would sell them for 40rs, although there
were some notable differences according to the type of tobacco being sold: “snuff at
three pesetas (12 reales) and Brazilian tobacco at 2 (8 rs)”
92. 
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These warehouses not only did not disappear, but they actually increased when
Spain, incapable of solving the issue by diplomatic maneuvers, secretly authorized the
establishing of salt warehouses along the Spanish border in order to sell exclusively to
French smugglers. The rise in salt prices in France and the direct attack that this meant
for the French monopoly was the detonator of an authentic warehouse war. The
Intendant of Barcelona, knowing well the superiority of the Spanish salt, ordered “make
greater quantities of Spanish salt available in the deposits on our side of the border, we
shall make a deal to suppress them when the French complain, fearful of the effects that
the superiority and affordability of the Spanish salt might have upon their incomes”
93.
The result of this trade battle between monopolies was that the Renta del Tabaco
continued to sell fewer and fewer tobaccos in Catalonia. The fall was already inevitable
and, significantly, it was only stopped during the war with France in 1794 the only two
years in which the monopoly was able to raise the tobacco sales in a proportion superior
to that of the rest of Spain. 
Conclusions.
The incorporation of Catalonia into the Spanish tobacco fiscal monopoly offered
an elevated consumer potential and theoretical support for the expansion strategies of
the monopoly, but when put into practice the reality of the situation was quite different.
Although the Renta del Tabaco aspired to create a perfect monopoly, and this led it to
control all the facets of the tobacco trade, from its production up to its sale, it
nonetheless failed to keep the market closed. The Catalan interests in relation to tobacco
previous to the incorporation of Catalonia into the estanco  continued to exist, and
served to exploit the weak points of the monopoly. The Spanish monopoly had to face a
flexible, well-structured illegal market sustained by the Catalan merchants, the
international trade and, ironically, supported by the French tobacco monopoly. The very
expansion policy of the monopoly, with its supplying of quality tobacco and uniform
prices, actually helped to worsen the situation. The result of this struggle between two
markets was that throughout the XVIII century the monopoly lost its market of Catalan
smokers, and had to satisfy itself with the demand for snuffed tobacco (which was
limited to few cities), while having to face an active contraband movement that flowed
from Catalonia towards the rest of the Spanish monopoly.  
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